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Similarities between the thinking of Martin Heidegger and traditions of 
Asian philosophy have long been noted. A signiﬁcant body of literature on 
this subject has appeared since the 1960s. Most of what has been written 
reﬂects Heidegger’s afﬁnity with East Asian Buddhism and Daoism. 
This is not surprising given Heidegger’s contact with representatives 
of East Asian Buddhism1, his indebtedness to East Asian philosophy2, 
his enthusiasm for Daoism3 and the enthusiastic reception his work has 
received in Japan4. Heidegger himself is reported as saying, on reading 
D. T. Suzuki on Zen Buddhism, “If I understand this man correctly, this 
is what I have been trying to say in all my writings.”5
Far less has been written about Heidegger in relation to Indian Buddhist 
tradition.6 This is a pity because, in many ways, the philosophical traditions 
of India and Europe are closer than the traditions of East Asia and Europe. 
One obvious connection is the common Indo-European language basis. 
Classical Greek (which Heidegger so admired) and Sanskrit are closely 
related. The Germans embraced Sanskrit and Indian studies with greater 
enthusiasm than any other group in Europe.7 Furthermore, the German 
Romantic tradition, to which Heidegger is indebted, looked to India as one 
of the sources of European civilisation and as an inspiration for a possible 
European cultural renaissance. Some of the Romantics looked to the East, 
particularly India, for an alternative vision to replace the “single-vision” 
of the rationalism and empiricism so prevalent in Europe. The Romantics, 
and later Heidegger, were concerned that this limited vision, which 
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was ﬁnding expression in an increasingly mechanical and technological 
civilisation, eroded our understanding of our own humanity.8 
A further connection between Heidegger and India is that there is a 
strong current of thought, especially within Buddhism, that is critical of 
any metaphysical thinking which attempts to ground reality in a reiﬁed 
absolute, or tries to build an ontology on the basis of enduring substances 
or essential natures. The Mahayana Buddhist idea of emptiness (sunyata) 
is central to this critique. It was the philosophy of sunyata that opened the 
way for the East Asian interchange between Buddhism and Daoism, the 
fruits of which are most evident in Zen (Chinese “Chan”) Buddhism. 
This paper considers Heidegger primarily in relation to sunyata 
(emptiness) as understood in Indian Mahayana Buddhism, particularly 
as articulated by the philosophers of the Madhyamika school headed 
by Nagarjuna (circa 200 C.E.). Both Heidegger and the Madhyamika 
thinkers (Madhyamikas) are concerned with being or existence and our 
relationship to it. Their central question concerns the way things (including 
ourselves) “are” and what makes their existence possible and intelligible. 
For Heidegger this entails an investigation of the Being of beings; for 
Madhyamikas it involves an understanding of emptiness and being. The 
two approaches converge on a number of points, particularly in their 
respective understanding of Being and emptiness as “no-thing”. For both, 
without this “no-thing”, nothing is possible. According to Madhyamikas 
and Heidegger our own mode of being in the world is crucially determined 
by our understanding of this issue.
The investigation into the nature of being is fundamental to Heidegger. 
This is not a question about any particular being or existent, but about 
being as such; it is about that which makes any being possible.9 It is equally 
a question of what it means to be, or how being can be meaningful to us. 
For Heidegger these questions and their variants, such as “What is the 
meaning, truth or essence of being?” or even “What are beings?” lie at the 
heart of philosophy. The ancient Greeks were struck by these questions. 
In their encounter with being philosophy was born. For Plato, philosophy 
begins with wonder at being. Heidegger, although he was to take issue 
with Plato’s understanding of being, begins Being and Time (1927) with 
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a quote from Plato about the meaning of “being”.10 For Heidegger, it is an 
indictment of Western civilisation that many who call themselves thinkers 
and philosophers regard these questions as meaningless or trivial.11 For 
him the history of Western metaphysics is in large measure a forgetting 
of the question of Being. He argues that it is urgent for our understanding 
of what we are as humans and for the future of Western civilisation that 
we restore the question of Being to its proper place.12
For Heidegger, unless this question of the nature of being is tackled from 
the beginning we will overlook the metaphysical presuppositions which 
shape all our enquiries, whether into science, art, psychology, or any other 
domain. Our metaphysical assumptions, which often go unquestioned, 
determine both the kind of questions we ask and the kind of answers 
that make sense to us. We are accustomed to begin our enquiries with 
epistemology, the theory of knowledge. For example, we ask, “How can we 
be certain that our knowledge of the world is correct?” “How can we even 
be certain that the objective world exists?” Such questions often disguise a 
number of assumptions about the subject, the world, the nature of thought 
and so on. Heidegger believes we need a more fundamental enquiry. We 
need to begin not with epistemology and the search for certainty but 
rather with an investigation into the conditions in which anything at all 
can have meaning or make sense to us. This involves an investigation of 
our existential situation, of what Heidegger calls Dasein. 
According to Heidegger we should not conceive of ourselves as isolated 
individuals or disembodied subjects but rather as Dasein, “being-there” 
or being-in-the-world. We always ﬁnd ourselves embedded in a “world”. 
The “world” in which we ﬁnd ourselves is not a thing or a being; rather it 
is that in which all things “are” and which is necessary for their disclosure. 
Only because we have “horizons” is a “world” possible. Past, present 
and future are “horizons” in which things can reveal themselves to us 
or make sense to us and in which we can understand ourselves. Dasein 
is temporal. It is not so much that we are necessarily “in” time (as Kant 
would have it) as that we, and all beings, are time. The very disclosure of 
things and ourselves is the disclosure of being and time.13 
Our mode of being in the world is “being-with.” We are being with 
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other people, and with things, and through this we are being ourselves.14 
Through our activities, which are often preconscious or prereﬂective, and 
through our interaction and dialogue with others, we establish meaning. 
To take an example from Heidegger, what a hammer is cannot be separated 
from what it is ‘for’ (e.g., building a bookshelf) and what it is ‘to us’ (to 
be a craftsman) which, in turn is related to the wider context of concerns, 
expectations etc. by which we understand our life. We cannot know what 
a hammer is simply by looking at it.15 
The ability to know something as something, e.g., a hammer as a 
hammer, requires the more general capacity to recognise entities as entities. 
That is to say to notice that they “are”. According to Heidegger this means 
that we must have some, not necessarily articulated, understanding of 
being as such (Being), as opposed to mere understanding of particular 
beings. Heidegger argues that our basic understanding is demonstrated 
by our capacity to use language. We could not have language without 
understanding “to be” and “being” in all their diverse uses. Heidegger 
says, “Suppose that there were no indeterminate meaning of Being, and 
that we did not understand what this meaning signiﬁes. Then what? 
Would there just be one noun and one verb less in our language? No. 
Then there would be no language at all.”16 The very fact that we can ask the 
question of what being means, or question ourselves about our own being, 
suggests we have some inkling of what kind of answer we are seeking. 
The question of being is not just an abstract question. The issue of 
existence is disclosed in our moods and feelings, most notably in angst, 
that sense of anxiety which is not directed towards anything in particular 
but in which we encounter our own nothingness, the possibility of our 
non-existence, our own ﬁnitude, our death. Our awareness of Being also 
opens the possibility of an attempted escape or “ﬂeeing from” our own 
ﬁnitude. It opens the possibility of “inauthenticity”, which expressess itself 
in forgetfulness of Being and distraction. A second order forgetting is also 
possible which “not only forgets the forgotten but forgets the forgetting 
itself.”17 Our awareness of Being also opens the possibility of “authenticity” 
in recollectedness and attunement to being.18
The fact that we can pose questions about the meaning of Being and 
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our own existence is, of course, only possible because of language. It is 
also only because of language that we can have the moods and feelings 
that are part of our humanity.19 According to Heidegger, language is not 
merely the means of asking questions about Being; it is inseparable from 
the questioner and the questioning and must be understood as constitutive 
of our humanity. We are not humans who use speech; rather speech enables 
us to be humans.20 
More radically, language (or thought) is inseparable from the existence 
of things. The pre-Socratic Greek thinker, Parmenidies, in a statement 
which Heidegger reﬂected upon extensively, said, “thought and being are 
the same.” By this Heidegger understood not a strict identity but a “going-
together” or inseparability. In Identity and Difference, Heidegger says, “it 
is in words and language that things ﬁrst come into being and are.”21 
Without the distinction, the difference, between Being and beings, 
nothing is. Also, in the distinction of Being and beings lies the possibility 
of language. If we had no understanding of Being (of “is”) we could 
not understand beings, the things that are, (or even “nothing”) or relate 
ourselves to them.22
So we can say that the difference that lies between Being and beings, 
makes any particular being (and nothing) possible. A thing must both 
“be” and “be something” i.e., different. The same difference comes to pass 
in language. The difference is between “is” (Being), without which we 
cannot say anything, and “something is” (beings). The same difference is 
actualised in Dasein, that is to say, allows Dasein to take itself as different 
to the world, to place itself outside the world, to ek-sist.23 Because of this 
difference, Dasein can “step forth” into the world, establish a relationship 
with it (realise the difference), and make itself something.24 Heidegger calls 
this difference “ontological difference”.25
In Heidegger’s early philosophy humanity is understood to take the 
initiative by the speaking which sets apart Being and beings and opens a 
space for, or allows, the presencing of beings. That is to say, humanity’s 
speaking allows the presence of things as things. In Heidegger’s later 
philosophy humanity is less central as the initiator of speech. Rather, 
Being takes the primary role and in its self-unfolding “speaks” humanity. 
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Humanity not so much speaks as is spoken by Being. “Speaking takes place 
as that which grants an abode for mortals.”26 That is to say, the ontological 
difference between Being and beings comes to pass as speech (or thought) 
and allows humanity to be humanity. 
In his earlier philosophy Heidegger focussed on Being. In large 
measure he did this because he believed that Being had been forgotten 
in philosophy which had come to concern itself only with beings. Being 
had to be retrieved. The course of forgetting needed to be retraced. Most 
of Western metaphysics had participated in and furthered the forgetting. 
Being needed to be remembered, and bought back to the centre of 
philosophy. In broader terms, humanity had to be bought back to itself 
(awakened to Dasein), or in historical terms, (since direct retrieval is 
impossible) given the possibility of a fresh encounter with Being and 
humanity’s own possibilities. 
In his later philosophical writings Heidegger shifts his focus from 
Being (the forgotten term in the relation of Being and beings) to the 
relation between Being and beings itself. The relation is bought about 
by, or presupposes, the difference between them. Thus difference itself 
becomes central, as it is in some sense prior to Being and beings. 
How we understand Being also determines how we understand beings 
(things). In his analysis Heidegger is concerned with both being as such 
(Being) and with beings. The question of how particular things exist is 
inseparable from the question of being as such. Heidegger believed that 
Western metaphysics had gone astray in its understanding of both. By 
forgetting Being it had failed to understand beings. It had failed to answer 
the question “What are beings?”
According to Heidegger, Being is not a being or entity. It is not one 
being among beings nor is it some kind of super entity. The notion of God 
as a being is thus rejected, as is the dogmatic theology based on this idea.27 
Nor is Being to be conceived in terms of eternity as opposed to time. The 
Platonic notion of eternal, incorporeal forms at once beyond becoming, yet 
the source of it, is rejected. Being is not Reality as opposed to appearance. 
We cannot go beyond the appearance of things to the reality (Being) which 
lies behind or beyond them.
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Being is not a thing. Strictly, it cannot even be a concept. The kind of 
thought that can “think” Being becomes a major concern of Heidegger’s 
later philosophy, as does the kind of language (or silence) that can “speak” 
it. Although Being is not to be conceived as a thing, it is not a nothing either. 
Being encompasses both. As Michael Inwood explains, “being extends to 
whatever is supposed to contrast with it.”28 Nor is being an empty cipher 
or a mere copula. Without Being, beings would not be possible. 
According to Heidegger, the history of Western metaphysics beginning 
with Plato, and perhaps even before him, is, in large measure, a history 
of “forgetting” of Being and, in consequence, a misunderstanding of how 
things exist. This forgetting takes on a particularly perverse form in the 
philosophy of Descartes, whose thought not only marks the beginning 
of modern philosophy, but also articulates a way of understanding being 
which is characteristic of modernity in general. The understanding of 
Descartes, which was preﬁgured in Galileo’s “mathematical projection” of 
reality, opens the possibility of “technology” which Heidegger understands 
not merely instrumentally but more essentially as a way of “enframing” 
the world. Technology is essentially a particular comportment toward 
“things” which cuts them off from their link with Being. The world, 
understood to be radically separated from the thinking subject (res 
cogitans) is, in accordance with Descartes’ mathematical method, reduced 
to one homogenous type, subject to measurement or quantiﬁcation (res 
extensa). Descartes’ way of understanding does not involve the discovery 
of new facts but rather involves a new vision, a new blueprint, or projection 
(Entwurf), whereby, as Guignon puts it, “entities come to be seen as 
interchangeable bits with no inner principles or internal relations to other 
components of nature.”29 As a result things come to be taken as mere objects, 
as a “standing reserve” or a “resource” whose value lies in meeting human 
needs.30 One consequence of this stance is that humanity itself comes to 
be regarded as a resource whose value comes to be understood in terms 
of utility. Thus the decline in our understanding of Being and beings also 
involves a loss in our understanding of our own humanity. 
As a consequence of objectifying things the idea of truth as 
correspondence between our ideas or mental representations and states of 
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affairs in the world becomes entrenched. The question of how we can be 
certain in our knowledge becomes central to philosophy.31 Hume, Kant and 
others accept this priority of certainty, and take up the question of whether 
the subject has a true picture of the world: whether our ideas, perceptions 
and other “inner” experiences correspond to the reality “outside” us.32 
But for Heidegger the fundamental sense of truth is not correspondence. 
More fundamentally, truth is a matter of revealing or “unconcealment” 
(aletheia) which requires a “clearing” (lichtung) in which the possibility of 
things disclosing themselves is realised. In the “clearing”, the presencing 
of entities takes place. Correspondence is one way in which beings may 
reveal themselves, it is one comportment towards things, but it involves 
alienating ourselves (as isolated subjects) from our more original way of 
being and from the world (now taken as object). Correspondence involves 
the representation (Vorstellung) of things as objects (Gegenstände) which 
stand against us. According to Heidegger if we take this particular 
comportment as the essence of truth, as the correct way that beings reveal 
themselves, as the only way to inhabit the world, we have succumbed to 
an impoverished understanding of truth, of the world, and of ourselves.33 
Attunement or openness to Being allows other possibilities for Being and 
beings to reveal themselves; it allows for a more fundamental presentation 
(as opposed to representation) of beings to take place. While calculative 
thinking objectiﬁes things and only deals with them at an ontic level 
(as things), meditative thinking allows movement from the ontic to the 
ontological level of Being and leads into the mystery (Geheimnis) of 
Being.34 This can never be captured or represented by objectifying thought. 
In his later philosophy Heidegger stresses Gelassenheit, “letting-be” 
or “releasement” from our usual willing, most particularly the willing 
which manifests in our attempt to comprehend, to take hold of, to grasp, 
things conceptually or by representational thought. “Letting-be” lets go 
of constrictive thinking and allows a clearing or opening in which Being 
can reveal itself in a more primordial way.35
The Buddha was ﬁrst and foremost concerned with the problem 
of duhkha (suffering/unsatisfactoriness) and its end.36 The Buddha’s 
approach can be described as pragmatic in that he urges that we eschew 
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metaphysical speculation about the origin of the world, the destiny of an 
enlightened person after death, and so on. Instead, he urges that we pay 
immediate and close attention to those factors that keep us enmeshed 
in a painful process of becoming (samsara) with no apparent possibility 
of peace or ﬁnality. Through developing insight into this process we 
can experience the end of suffering (nirvana) for ourselves. Despite the 
pragmatism, the Buddha’s approach is metaphysical insofar as his analysis 
involves a fundamental enquiry into the nature of our “selves” and the 
“world” and the “things” which constitute it. 
The Buddha’s approach is existential in that it starts with a primary 
given of our own experience, namely duhkha, and provides a path for 
the transformation of ourselves and our experience, culminating in the 
realisation of nirvana. It is not primarily concerned with theoretical 
knowledge of the world or ourselves. 
The Buddha’s approach is also broadly phenomenological in that it 
is deals with the world as we experience it. As the Buddha says, “within 
this very fathom-long body, with its perceptions and inner sense, lies the 
world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world and the path 
that leads to the cessation of the world”.37 The Buddha does not consider 
what things might be “in-themselves” apart from their being experienced 
by us.38
We can immediately see points of contact with Heidegger’s approach, 
which has its roots in phenomenology and which involves an existential 
analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s concern is not 
with theoretical knowledge (which he understands as derivative) but 
with the conditions for intelligibility, which must be discovered in Dasein 
itself. Unlike the Buddha, Heidegger is not primarily interested in the 
transformation of the self. Nonetheless any change in Dasein’s self-
understanding necessarily involves change in Dasein. That is to say, self-
understanding is intrinsic to what Dasein is.39 As Heidegger says, Dasein’s 
being is always an issue for it.40 Also, just as angst can serve to awaken 
Dasein to its possibilities, or be an occasion for escape into distraction 
and inauthenticity, so the encounter with duhkha can mark the ﬁrst stage 
on the path to awakening, or can result in denial and attempted escape. 
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Angst and duhkha are linked respectively by Heidegger and the Buddha 
to our temporality and ﬁnitude.41
The Buddha identiﬁes three “root causes” of suffering: ignorance 
(avidya, moha), craving (trsna) and aversion (dvesa). Of these, the primary 
cause is ignorance or delusion, the precondition for the operation of the 
other two. The Buddha taught that the most critical aspect of ignorance is 
our mistaken understanding of who we are. According to his teaching, we 
take ourselves to be ﬁxed or enduring independent “selves” (atman) when, 
in fact we are no such thing. On this mistaken basis we become involved in 
a frustrating process to secure, protect, enhance and satisfy this “self”. 
According to the Buddha, we are mistaken not only about ourselves 
but also about the world. We believe that world is made up of “things” 
with an enduring essence or identity (atman) when, in fact, “things” are 
impermanent and without essence or identity, just as we are. Our attempts 
to grasp the world and ﬁnd permanent satisfaction in it are as futile as 
our attempts to establish ourselves.
From the Buddhist perspective, our wrong view of self involves a 
reiﬁcation of ourselves. We take ourselves as things, with an individual 
existence and essential nature. We imagine that we have svabhava. 
Svabhava can be literally translated as “own-being”, and conveys both 
the sense of independent existence and essential nature. Our reiﬁcation 
of objects in the world also involves taking them to exist independently 
and substantially, i.e., with svabhava. In the language of the Buddhist 
philosophical schools, the teaching of non-self (anatma) is understood 
as absence of “own-being” or absence of self-existence (nihsvabhava). In 
Mahayana Buddhism, where the implications of absence of own-being are 
probed most deeply, all things (selves and objects) are said to be “empty” 
(sunya) in the sense that they are devoid of, or lacking, independent 
existence, individual identity and essential nature.42 Emptiness (sunyata) 
is understood primarily in terms of the absence of svabhava.43
Two points can be made here in connection with Heidegger’s thinking. 
These points not only relate to what has just been stated but also throw light 
on the discussion of sunyata which follows. Firstly, it is in representational 
thinking, that things are taken to exist objectively (i.e., in themselves). 
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Secondly, representational thinking involves introducing a split between 
subject and object. Both Buddhism and Heidegger would agree that the 
dualism is linked with an attempt to control the world (as as an object 
for the self’s satisfaction or as a “resource”). They would also agree that 
this mode of being is constrictive and conceals a more fundamental way 
of being in the world. According to Heidegger it is only through a letting 
go (Gelassenheit) of representational thought that this more fundamental 
mode of being can be realised. According to Buddhism, by letting go of all 
clinging to selves and things we can experience the freedom of nirvana. 
The emptiness of all things (including nirvana) is declared repeatedly 
in the Prajñaparamita (“Perfection of Wisdom”) Sutras of Mahayana 
Buddhism but no systematic account of sunyata is given within the 
sutras (circa 100 B.C.E.). It was Nagarjuna (circa 200 C.E.) and the other 
philosophers of the Madhyamika (“Middle Way”) School who provided 
cogent argumentation against self-existence (svabhava) and fully explored 
the implications of sunyata44 Nagarjuna declared the outlook of the 
school and demonstrated its methodology in the foundational text, the 
Madhyamakakarika (“Verses on the Middle Way”). The Madhyamikas 
resisted and criticised any tendency towards substantialism or essentialism 
in Buddhism. They argued that these tendencies deviate from the “middle 
way” which must avoid the extremes of permanent identity on one hand 
or incoherence or complete negation on the other.
In the Madhyamakakarika, Nagarjuna takes the principle of dependent 
origination (pratityasamutpada), found in Buddhism from the earliest 
period, and declares its true import to be emptiness (sunyata). The 
doctrine of dependent origination reﬂects the Buddhist emphasis on 
relationship and process. It aimed to provide a coherent account of the 
process of becoming without resort to individual entities, enduring states 
or substances. According to this principle, things never arise or are found 
by themselves, but always with others. According to Nagarjuna, when 
properly understood, this entails their lack of essential nature or self-
existence (svabhava) and shows that they are empty (sunya). All things 
arise in mutual dependence and, on analysis, cannot be found apart from 
the causes and conditions of their arising and persistence. An individual 
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thing or being (bhava), Nagarjuna declares, is an abstraction (vikalpa), 
thought construction (kalpana) or conventional designation (prajñapti) 
through which a ‘thing’ is made to appear different to and more than the 
sum total of its causes and conditions. 
Some early Buddhist philosophers had argued - incorrectly according 
to Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas - that all conditioned things, both 
subjective and objective, could be analysed in terms of an irreducible 
number of momentary qualities or dharmas, which might be regarded as 
the ultimate constituents of all ‘wholes’.45 This understanding of dharmas 
was, the Madhyamikas argued, contrary to the principle of dependent 
origination (pratityasamutpada) according to which all conditioned things, 
dharmas included, arise and perish in dependence on others. That which 
arises in dependence on others cannot have an essence or being of its own 
(i.e., independent of others) and thus cannot be regarded as ultimate, the 
Madhyamikas argued.
The Madhyamika philosophers asserted that all things are in fact 
no-thing or empty (sunya). Wholes are empty and so are the constituent 
dharmas.46 Reality is not to be understood in terms of “building blocks”. 
Those philosophers who maintained the ultimacy of dharmas were guilty, 
according to the Madhyamikas, of a subtle kind of clinging to ‘things’ 
under the guise of dharmas. In our ordinary understanding things may 
appear to exist individually but on closer investigation cannot be found 
“in-themselves” separate from the matrix of causes and conditions in 
which they arise or exist.
Furthermore, the Madhyamikas argued, the notion of an ultimate (i.e., 
independent) particular is incoherent. According to them the notion of a 
particular involves the notion of difference and to be different necessarily 
involves another (to be different from). This means a particular cannot exist 
without another and hence is not independent or ultimate. As Nagarjuna 
in Madhyamakakarika XIV, 5 writes, “A thing is different insofar as it is 
different from an other; it is not different without being different from 
the other.”
In the Madhyamika analysis, things are not entirely negated, but 
understood to have a relative or conventional existence. This is to be 
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understood in two ways which are, in fact, related. Firstly, things have a 
relative existence insofar as they arise or exist in relation to other things. This 
follows from the principle of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) 
which can equally be translated as “co-dependent origination”. That 
is to say, things exist in a network of relationships but they cannot be 
identiﬁed without reference to that network since their existence is only 
relational. Secondly, and following from the ﬁrst, things are understood to 
have a relative existence, or conventional existence, since their “identity” 
as individual existents is dependent on language and human usage 
(conventions).47 It is only in language or abstract thought that a “thing” 
can be made to appear different to the matrix of causes and conditions 
in which it is embedded. Things have an identity through language and 
human conventional usage (vyavahara). In Heideggerian terms, only 
through language do they “exist” or stand apart. It does not make sense 
to ask what they are “in-themselves” in any metaphysical sense.
Nagarjuna warns against a reiﬁcation of emptiness. Emptiness is 
not a thing; it is a no-thing. Sunyata is not one thing among many. In 
Heideggerian terms, it is not ontic. Nor is sunyata something that stands 
above things or transcends things in the sense of an ontological absolute. 
It is not a super entity or transcendental being existing in a supersensible 
realm. In fact it is not any kind of entity or existent (bhava) at all. Nor can 
it be understood as a ground, since it is not something underlying beings. 
It is not possible to “peel back” beings to see what lies behind, under, or 
over them. Sunyata is not a reality hidden behind that which appears or, 
in Heideggerian terms, that which presences.48 It is not possible to negate 
or remove what appears or presences to uncover the absolute ground. 
While those who believe in “things” may have a problem, Nagarjuna says 
that those who believe in sunyata (as some kind of thing, even the most 
universal or absolute one) are incurable!49 If we abandon things for sunyata 
taken as a reiﬁed absolute, we are in a worse position than before! On the 
other hand, nothing is possible or works (yujyate) without emptiness. 
Without it nothing makes sense.50
The early Buddhist philosophers had set in opposition the world 
of conditioned dharmas (samsara) on one side, and the unconditioned 
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(nirvana) on the other. But this is rejected by the Madhyamikas. Samsara 
and nirvana are both empty. The Prajñaparamita Sutras say that if there 
were anything “higher” than nirvana that too would be empty. Only if 
one accepts a substance-based ontology where different kinds of things 
can be set against each other is the opposition possible. Once the notion 
of thingness breaks down and emptiness or no-thingness (sunyata) 
is realised this distinction can no longer be maintained. The realm of 
conditioned dharmas, the realm of birth and death, the realm of time, the 
realm of samsara, has no separate existence to, cannot be set apart from, 
the world of nirvana. Likewise the world of nirvana does not stand apart 
from samsara: the realm of nirvana is not a self-existent reality beyond the 
everyday world. Immediate reality is not to be negated for a hypostatised 
ultimate. Ontologically there is no difference between them. The difference 
is one of existential realisation. Nagarjuna writes, ‘The limit of nirvana is 
the limit of samsara. Between the two there is not the slightest difference 
whatsoever’.51 The realisation of nirvana does not require abandoning the 
world and hence is not opposed to authentic engagement in the world.
This distinction between things and emptiness is an expression 
of the doctrine of the “two truths” which became central to Buddhist 
philosophy through Nagarjuna’s explication of sunyata. The absolute truth 
(paramarthasatya) is the truth of emptiness (sunyata), the truth that all 
things are empty (sunya) whether they be wholes (trees, mountains, chairs, 
people etc) or constituents (dharmas). The relative or conventional truth 
(samvrtisatya) is that they are not entirely negated but are understood to 
have a relative or conventional existence.52 As seen above, things have an 
existence in relation to other things but not on their own (svatah); their 
existence is only relational. Things have an identity through language 
and usage. Only through this do they “stand out” as existents, or exist, 
and only through language, which is itself rooted in human practices, do 
they become what they are to us. One could say that both their existence 
(astitva) and their essence (svabhava) are conventional. 
The distinction between the two truths has much in common with 
the “ontological difference” understood by Heidegger as the difference 
between Being and all beings. For Heidegger although this difference 
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is meaningful – it is in fact fundamental for Dasein and the source of 
meaning – nevertheless Being is not to be found separate from beings. 
Being for Heidegger is not a thing or existent but is closer to the sunyata 
of Nagarjuna which is not separate from things. Heidegger rejects the 
metaphysical understanding of the difference which would see Being 
as the One, the Absolute, as that which underlies all beings, and thus 
stands beyond them and separate to them. Being is better understood in 
terms of nothingness (das Nichts) or the openness which makes all being 
possible. Heidegger writes, “Nothingness is neither an object nor anything 
that ‘is’ at all; it occurs neither by itself nor ‘apart from’ beings, as a sort 
of adjunct. Nothingness is that which makes the disclosure of being(s) 
as such possible for our human existence.”53 Likewise for Nagarjuna, 
sunyata is no-thing, but without it nothing is possible. To put it another 
way, if things had svabhava, presencing or existing would be impossible. 
If things had svabhava they could not enter into any relationship at all. 
Nagarjuna says if you postulate svabhava, “You will negate cause, effect, 
doer, means of doing, action, arising, cessation and result.”54 Absence 
of svabhava (nihsvabhava) can be understood as the “crucial absence” 
through which emptiness and things inseparably reveal themselves.55 As 
Heidegger might put it, emptiness is not a counterconcept of beings but 
belongs to their essential unfolding as such.56
To turn from sunyata to things, or in Heideggerian terms, from Being 
to beings, if things are not just lying “there”, if they have no “identity”, 
in what manner are they? What can we afﬁrm about them? This side is 
not developed by Nagarjuna. For him sunyata is taught as a medicine to 
overcome our wrong understanding, our clinging to “things” of any sort 
whatsoever. His task is to negate the view of independent existence and the 
whole network of concepts integral to such a view. Thus our elaboration of 
the world is broken down and we break through to awakened awareness 
(buddhajñana). This is the purpose of the Buddha’s teaching. As Nagarjuna 
says, nothing positive was afﬁrmed by the Buddha, “No thing (or doctrine) 
(dharma) was pointed out (or taught) (desita) by the Buddha anywhere 
to anyone”.57 Sunyata is the way out (nihsarana) of all views.58
There is a more positive reading but it does not come directly from 
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Nagarjuna or the other Indian Madhyamika philosophers. According to the 
positive reading, given that things arise or exist in a network of relations, 
each thing necessarily involves every other thing. The being or coming 
forth of an entity is the coming forth of the totality. Any change in one 
entity implies change to the entire system. The totality is not “assembled” 
out of particulars; rather particulars have their meaning in relation to, and 
are an expression of, the totality.59 This vision ﬁnds its most celebrated 
expression in the “Jewel Net of Indra” from the Avatamsaka Sutra which 
likens the totality to an inﬁnite net with a jewel at every node: “since the net 
itself is inﬁnite in dimension, the jewels are inﬁnite in number. There hang 
the jewels, glittering like stars of the ﬁrst magnitude, a wonderful sight 
to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection 
and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there 
are reﬂected all the other jewels in the net, inﬁnite in number. Not only 
that, but each of the jewels reﬂected in this one jewel is also reﬂecting all 
the other jewels, so that the process of reﬂection is inﬁnite.”60 
An inﬂuential contemporary writer on Buddhism, the Vietnamese 
teacher Thich Nhat Hanh, reads the Prajñaparamita Sutras, which were 
the central inspiration for Madhyamika thought, in a similar positive 
way. In his commentary on the Heart Sutra, one of the shortest and yet 
most inﬂuential of the Prajñaparamita Sutras, he says, “If you are a poet, 
you will see clearly that there is a cloud ﬂoating in this sheet of paper. 
Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow, 
and without trees, we cannot make paper. The cloud is essential for the 
paper to exist. If the cloud is not here, the sheet of paper cannot be here 
either. … If we look into this sheet of paper even more deeply, we can see 
the sunshine in it. If the sunshine is not there, the tree cannot grow. In 
fact, nothing can grow. Even we cannot grow without sunshine. And so, 
we know that the sunshine is also in this sheet of paper. The paper and 
the sunshine inter-are. And if we continue to look, we can see the logger 
who cut the tree and brought it to the mill to be transformed into paper. 
And we see the wheat. We know the logger cannot exist without his daily 
bread … To be is to inter-be. You cannot be just by yourself alone. You 
have to be with everything else.”61
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Thich Nhat Hanh, relates this “fullness” to the emptiness (sunyata) 
which is the central message of the Heart Sutra: “If I am holding a cup and 
I ask you, ‘Is this cup empty?” you will say, “No, it is full of water.” But if 
I pour out the water and ask you again, you may say, “Yes, it is empty.” 
But empty of what? The cup cannot be empty of nothing. “Empty” doesn’t 
mean anything unless you know empty of what. My cup is empty of water 
but it is not empty of air. To be empty means to be empty of something. … 
When Avalokita says that our sheet of paper is empty he means empty of 
a separate, independent existence. It cannot just be by itself. … It is empty 
of a separate self. But empty of a separate self means full of everything.”62 
In this commentary Thich Nhat Hanh is expressing in more contemporary 
language the inseparability of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) 
(which he calls “interbeing”) and emptiness (sunyata).
Heidegger’s later writings are resonant with this. After his “turn” from 
a more anthropocentric to a Being-centred approach, Heidegger focussed 
less on human existence and tended to see Dasein as part of the larger 
self-disclosure (and self-concealment) of Being. Human existence becomes 
the site for this disclosure of Being, and in some sense subordinate to it. 
In attempting to articulate the larger framework Heidegger spoke of the 
gathering together of mortals and gods, earth and sky. The gathering 
together and play or dance of the four (das Geviert) constitutes the unity 
of the World. The World is not caused and has no ground; it happens 
or opens out of its own “world-ing”. Humans realise their authenticity 
or authentic way of being by dwelling in and shepherding this relation 
with being. “We are in the strict sense of the term the be-thinged (die Be-
Dingten, i.e., conditioned by our relationship with things).”63 
Things are constituted by this meeting or “gathering”. Heidegger 
considers a pitcher: “In the water of the spring the marriage of heaven 
and earth is present. This marriage is present in the wine which is the gift 
of the fruit of the vine; in the fruit the nourishing earth and the sun in the 
sky are joined together in marriage … The gift of that which ﬂows from 
it is the essence of the pitcher. In the essence of the pitcher are heaven 
and earth.”64
In this paper some of the convergences in the thought of Heidegger 
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and Buddhism have been explored.65 Particular attention has been given 
to how Heidegger and the Madhyamika philosophers have respectively 
presented Being and emptiness as the no-thing without which nothing 
can be. Although Being and sunyata have no reality of their own and are 
thus no “ground” as commonly understood, without them we cannot 
make sense of anything or, as Nagarjuna says, “nothing works”. For 
Heidegger and the Madhyamikas, how we understand the relationship 
of Being and beings, or emptiness and beings, is necessarily tied up with 
our conceptions of ourselves and of humanity. For Heidegger and the 
Madhyamikas, language and human practices have a vital inﬂuence 
on how things appear or are present. Letting go of our representational 
thinking and our clinging to the “things” represented by it opens the way 
to a more originary mode of being in the world in which phenomena 
appear or “shine forth” in their openness and interrelatedness.
NOTES
1 Interestingly, Heidegger’s On the Way to Language begins with “A Dialogue on Language (between 
a Japanese and an Inquirer)”, translated by P. D. Hertz, Harper & Row, New York, 1971
2 See Reinhard May, Heidegger’s hidden sources: East Asian inﬂuences on his work, translated with a 
complementary essay by Graham Parkes, Routledge, London & New York, 1996.
3 Heidegger worked during the summer of 1946 with a Chinese student on a translation of portions 
of the Daoist classic, the Daodejing (Dao Te Ching). See Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, “Heidegger and Our 
Translation of the Dao Te Ching” in Heidegger and Asian Thought, Graham Parkes (ed.), University 
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987.
4 See Yasuo Yuasa, “The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger” in Parkes 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 155-174. Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) has been translated into Japanese many 
times and was translated into Japanese three times before the ﬁrst English translation was 
published in 1962.
5 Reported by William Barrett, Introduction to D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism, Garden Doubleday, City, 
N.Y., 1956, p. xi. Suzuki (1870-1966), was the most inﬂuential interpreter of Zen Buddhism to the 
West. 
6 Even a writer such a Nishitani Keiji (a prominent representative of the Kyoto School of Japanese 
philosophy which drew on both Buddhist and European traditions) who studied with Heidegger 
in Freiburg, makes little direct reference to Indian non-canonical sources when discussing sunyata 
(emptiness, absolute nothingness), preferring to draw most of his material from Chinese and 
Japanese Chan/Zen literature. His magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness, makes no reference to 
Nagarjuna, the foremost philosopher of emptiness in India.
7 The connections are not only linguistic but also cultural and historical. The notion of “Aryanism” 
which found perverted expression in National Socialism is one consequence of this.
8 See Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding, State University of 
New York, Albany 1988, ch. 5, and J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian 
and Western Thought, Routledge, London, 1997, ch. 4. The expression “single vision” is borrowed 
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from William Blake, “May God us keep from Single vision & Newton’s sleep”. (“Letter to Thomas 
Butts” 1802)
9 It is about the Being (Sein) of beings (Seinde). Heidegger distinguishes the “ontic” which relates to 
particular beings or the taxonomy of beings and “ontology” proper or “fundamental ontology” 
which relate to Being and what it is to “be”. 
10 “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. 
We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.” Being and Time, 
translated by John Macquarie & Edward Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 1.
11 For example, Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of logical positivism, regarded questions about 
the nature of Being as metaphysical nonsense caused solely by ambiguities in our use of the 
verb “to be”. Charles H. Kahn furnishes another example from the English philosopher Bertrand 
Russell: “Russell once described it as ‘a disgrace to the human race’ that it has chosen the same 
word ‘is’ for two such entirely different ideas as predication and identity”. Cited in Gregory 
Fried, “What’s in a Word? Heidegger’s Grammar and Etymology of ‘Being’” in A Companion to 
Heidegger’s “Introduction to Metaphysics”, Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (eds), Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London, 2001, pp. 125-142, p. 137. 
12 And for world civilisation given what Heidegger calls the “Europeanisation of the world”.
13 See Being and Time p. 415 ff. Heidegger does not discount clock time or our ordinary 
understanding of time but regards them as less fundamental and derivative from a more 
primordial existential time (i.e., time as existence). 
14 Heidegger distingushes being “with” others (Mitsein), being “alongside” (Sein bei) things, and 
being-one’s-self (Selbstein). Each presupposes the others. See Michael Inwood, A Heidegger 
Dictionary, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, pp. 31-32. 
15 Being and Time, op cit., p. 98. In our abstract thinking we tend to take our knowledge of the 
hammer as an object as primary and any question of what it is for us as belonging to secondary 
interpretation. But Heidegger reverses the usual priority given to knowledge over interpretation. 
For him interpretation (understanding) determines the possibility of knowledge. Our theoretical 
attitude and “objective” knowledge are only possible because of a particular way of taking or 
understanding things. 
16 Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Yale University Press, 
New Haven & London, 2000, p. 86.
17 The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, cited in Charles Guignon “Authenticity, moral values, 
psychotherapy” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Charles Guignon (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 215-39, p. 227.
18 In a “resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit) (stressed in Heidegger’s early thinking) which squarely 
faces our ﬁnititude and refuses to forget itself in everyday concerns, or in a “letting-be” or 
“releasement” (Gelassenheit) (stressed in Heidegger’s later philosophy) which opens a space for 
beings to reveal themselves, to “be lit” or to “shine forth”. 
19 For Heidegger language and thinking are deﬁnitely not limited to rationality. Heidegger 
struggled against the understanding of rationality (modelled on mathematics) as the essence of 
thinking. On the mathematical model and its inﬂuence on conceptions of the subject and thinking, 
see “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics (from What is a Thing)”, in David Farrell 
Krell (ed.) Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, HarperCollins, San Francisco, 1993, pp. 271-305, esp. 
pp. 295-305.
20 “It is to say that only speech enables man to be the living being he is as man. It is as one who 
speaks that man is – man.” “Language” in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert 
Hofstadter, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p. 189. Guignon discusses the difference between 
“instrumentalist” and “constitutive” views of language in Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the 
Problem of Knowledge, Hacket Publishing Company, 1983, pp. 115-32. The latter view is brilliantly 
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expressed in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
21 Translated by Joan Stanbaugh, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, p. 37.
22 As Inwood expresses it, “Everything, apart from being itself, is a being; anything that is red, a 
tree, or like something else must already be. Moreover, beings (unlike trees, red things or similar 
things) form a whole or a world. Our ability to regard anything as anything, and locate it or 
ourselves in the world, depends on our understanding of being: ‘In every silent comportment to 
beings too the “is” speaks’.” Op. cit., p. 47.
23 Dasein is transcendent but not in an ontic sense of going beyond to some other realm of things; the 
transcendence is ontological going “beyond” beings to Being. 
24 Dasein has no essence of its own. See Inwood, op. cit., p. 60
25 Ontological difference is unlike the ontical difference between one being and another.
26 “Language” in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter op. cit., p. 192.
27 Being and Time was nevertheless received with great enthusiasm by those theologians who 
rejected dogmatic theology in favour of the factical Christianity of the New Testament. See John 
D. Caputo, “Heidegger and theology” in Guignon, op. cit. 1993, pp. 270-88. 
28 Inwood, op. cit. p. 48. We can say “something is” and “nothing is”.
29 Guignon op. cit. 1983, p. 163.
30 Descartes (echoing Bacon) claims, “we can employ these entities for all the purposes for which they 
are suited, and so make ourselves masters and possessors of nature”. Discourse on Method, vi. 62. 
What Heidegger means by Entwurf is clearly expressed by Kant: “reason only gains insight into 
what it produces itself according to its own project (Entwurf)”. Cited in Krell, op. cit., fn. p. 288.
31 According to Heidegger, in Descartes’ thought, the human subject becomes the ground of 
certainty only because mathematics is considered the basis of thought (reason) and the measure 
of reality. Rational thought is understood to be the essence of the human subject (res cogitans) and 
the principal of intelligibilty. “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics (from What is a 
Thing)”, in David Farrell Krell (ed.) Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, HarperCollins, San Francisco, 
1993, pp. 271-305, p. 298.
32 For Kant, the question of whether we can know the external world as it really is, i.e., the thing-in-
itself (ding an sich), becomes central. Again, he takes up the mathematical model as the grounds of 
that certainty and turns to Newton as the model for philosophy: “The true method of metaphysics 
is fundamentally the same as that which Newton has introduced into natural science, and which 
has there yielded such fruitful results…” Cited in E. F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed, 
Abacus, London, 1978, p. 19. 
33 Every revealing allows things to be taken in a certain way and also involves concealing other 
possible ways: there could be no revealing without concealing.
34 On the distinction between calculative thinking and meditative thinking see Heidegger’s 
Discourse On Thinking, translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, New York, Harper & 
Row, 1966.
35 As John Caputo observes, “Being is not something that human thinking can conceive or ‘grasp’ 
(be-greifen, con-capere) but something that can only be ‘granted’ … The work that man can do is not 
to will but to not-will, to prepare a clearing and opening in which being may come.” op. cit., p. 282.
36 ‘Two things I teach: suffering and the cessation of suffering’. Majjhima Nikaya I. 40. The Four 
Noble Truths are an elaboration of these: the universality and nature of suffering, the cause of 
suffering, the end of suffering, and path to the end of suffering.
37 Samyutta Nikaya II, also Anguttara Nikaya IV, 46
38 For an elaboration of these points see Joan Stambaugh, The Real is not the Rational, State University 
of New York, 1986, pp. 95-99.
39 “Understanding of Being is itself a deﬁnitive characteristic of Dasein’s being.” Being and Time, 
p.32.
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40 Ibid.
41 The three characteristics of all conditoned things according to Buddhism are: unsatisfactoriness 
(duhkha), impermanence (anitya) and non-self (anatma).
42 The idea that things are empty is found in pre-Mahayana Buddhism but is not elaborated there. 
The doctrine of emptiness can be understood as a more comprehensive explanation of non-self 
(anatma).
43 There was disagreement about whether, and in what way, sunyata could be expressed positively.
44 Strictly speaking the school is “Madhyamaka” from which we get the adjective “Madhyamika” 
(“belonging to Madhyamaka”) which describes the doctrines or followers of the Madhyamaka 
School. However, in general usage, the term “Madhyamika” is used for both the School and what 
relates to the School and will be so used here.
45 These were predominantly Abhidharmikas who were, in the Abhidharma (“Higher Teaching”), 
attempting to give a concise and abstract account of the Buddha’s teaching (dharma) which had 
been given over a forty-ﬁve year period to diverse audiences.
46 Technically this is known as pudgalasunyata (emptiness of wholes) and dharmasunyata (emptiness 
of constituents). According to Mahayana philosophers the ﬁrst kind of emptiness is common to all 
Buddhism; the second is fully explicated only in the Mahayana.
47 This understanding was summed up by Nagarjuna: “We explain that whatever is dependent 
origination, that is emptiness. It is a dependent designation (or thought construct – vijñapti). That 
is the middle path” Madhyamakakarika XXIV, 18
48 The distinction between reality and appearance as found, for example, in Plato and Hindu 
Vedanta (as usually explained), is not applicable here.
49 Or “incorrigible” (asadhya). Madhyamakakarika XIII, 8. Sunyata cannot be conceived of as a 
universal. To be a universal sunyata would have to differ from other universals and be something 
“speciﬁc”. To put it another way, even universals are things, albeit of an unusual kind, but sunyata 
is not a thing.
50 sarvam na yujyate tasya sunyam yasya na yujyate. Madhyamakakarika XIII, 14. 
51 Madhyamikakarika XXV, 20.
52 Literally “truth of concealment”. This is interesting in itself given that Heidegger understands 
truth as “unconcealment” (aletheia).
53 From What is Metaphysics cited in Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 210. For an alternate translation see David Farrell Krell (ed.) Martin 
Heidegger: Basic Writings, p. 104.
54 Madhyamakakarika XXIV, 17. 
55 I am indebed to Andrew McGarrity for the idea of “crucial absence”.
56 Heidegger actually says, “The nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings, 
rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such.” From What is Metaphysics in 
David Farrell Krell (ed.) op. cit. p. 104.
57 This verse plays on the multivalence of the words dharma and desita. “Dharma” means a “thing” in 
the sense of an ultimate constituent and also the teaching of the Buddha. In roman script these are 
usually distinguished by the use of upper and lower case as “Dharma” and “dharma” but scripts 
used to write Sanskrit make no such distinction. “Desita” is the past participle of the verbal root 
“dis” “to point out” and can be translated as “pointed out” (or “afﬁrmed”) or “taught”. 
58 Madhyamikakarika XIII, 8.
59 Cf. Charles Guignon 1983, op. cit., p. 46 ff. where Guignon discusses the Western “holistic views” 
in relation to Hegel and Dilthey and their inﬂuence on Heidegger’s understanding. Note that the 
Buddhist view is not teleological; things are not evolving towards some point.
60 Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, Pennsylvania State University Press, 
University Park, 1977, p 2. This metaphor became central to Chinese Hua-yen Buddhism.
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61 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajñaparamita Heart Sutra, 
Parallax Press, Berkeley, 1988, pp. 3-4.
62 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
63 From Das Ding, cited by J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Harper & Row, New York, 
1971, p. 221.
64 From Vorträge und Aufsatz, 1954, Cited in Ronald S. Valle and Rolf von Eckartsberg, “Heideggerian 
Thinking and the Eastern Mind” in Ronald S. Valle and Rolf von Eckartsberg (eds), The Metaphors 
of Consciousness, Plenum Press, New York, 1981, pp. 287-311, p. 293.
65 Space has precluded consideration of the many differences between Heidegger and Buddhism. 
Some of these are: Heidegger and the Buddhist thinkers operate within different worldviews. 
With the Buddhist view, for example, including notions such as rebirth and karma; the purpose 
of Madhyamika analysis is purely soteriological whereas Heidegger is, amongst other things, 
interested in giving an existential account of the possibilities of all knowledge, including scientiﬁc 
knowledge; Heidegger unlike the Buddhist thinkers is intensely interested in history and the 
historical encounter with Being; Heidegger gives greater emphasis to thinking whereas “non-
thinking” is more prominent in Buddhism. 
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